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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Plaintiff-Appellant (herein "Plaintiff") disputes the 
Defendant-Appellees1 (herein "Defendants") mischaracterizations 
concerning the appropriate standard of review contained through 
their Brief. First, state courts have jurisdiction to 
entertain Section 1983 Actions. Martinez v. California, 444 
U.S. 277, 283-284, n.8, 100 S.Ct. 553, 558, n.8 (1980) and 
Maine v. Thiboutot, 488 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502 (1980). Second, 
a dismissal under Rule 12(b) U.R.C.P. is a severe measure and 
only should be granted unless it is clear that a party is not 
entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved 
in support of the party's claim. Coleman v. Utah State Land 
Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990). Third, under Section 1983, a 
plaintiff is required to make only two allegations in order to 
state a cause of action under the statute: (1) that some 
person deprived him of a federal right, and (2) that such 
person acted under color of state or territorial law. Gomez v. 
Toledo, 466 U.S. 635 (1980). Fourth, complaints asserting 
Section 1983 claims are to be liberally construed. Morrison v. 
Jones, 607 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. den. 100 S.Ct. 1648 
(1980). Fifth, no specific reference to Section 1983 is 
required to state a claim under Section 1983. Maher v. Gagne, 
448 U.S. 122, 128-29 n. 11 (1980). 
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Point One 
THE DEFENDANT UTAH STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE INDIVIDUAL 
DEFENDANTS IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES ARE PERSONS UNDER 
SECTION 1983 AND MAY BE SUED FOR PROSPECTIVE INJUNCTIVE 
RELIEF, ANCILLARY ATTORNEYS FEES AND COURT COSTS 
The Defendant has attempted to throw confusion into the 
analysis of this issue. While it is true that the State and 
its agencies are not persons under Section 1983 for damage 
actions, Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 
105 L.Ed.45, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989), Will makes it clear that a 
state, its agencies and officers in official capacities, are 
persons under Section 1983 for prospective injunctive relief. 
Will, supra, 105 L.Ed, at 58, n. 10. The reason for this is 
because such actions are not treated as actions against the 
state. This includes ancillary attorneys fees and court costs. 
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). Further, contrary to the 
Defendants1 assertion, a Section 1983 action for damages may 
lie against state officials in their individual capacities. 
Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358 (1991). Hafer is significant 
because Hafer clarified its decision in Will. The Supreme 
Court in Hafer held, supra at 360: 
"In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 
(citation omitted) we held that state officials 
'acting in their official capacities1 are outside 
the class of 'persons1 subject to liability under 
42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Petitioner takes this 
language to mean that Section 1983 does not 
authorize suits against state officers for damages 
arising from official acts. We reject this reading 
of Will and hold that state officials sued in their 
individual capacities are 'persons1 for purposes of 
Section 1983." 
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In the present action, the Plaintiff filed an initial 
Complaint, Record, Page 2, an Amended Complaint, Record, Page 
179, and a Second Amended Complaint. Exhibit A to Appellant's 
Brief. Each of these complaints allege that the Plaintiff was 
denied his federal rights by the Defendants under state law. 
In addition, the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint sets 
forth the parties with particularity and the manner in which 
they are sued. Paragraph 3 alleges that the Defendant State 
Board of Education is sued for prospective injunctive relief, 
attorneys fees and court costs. Will, supra. Paragraphs 4 
through 7 allege that the named individual Defendants are sued 
both in their individual capacities for the damages alleged, 
and in their official capacities for the injunctive prospective 
relief alleged. Hafer, supra. The Plaintiff's Second Amended 
Complaint seeks an injunction restoring the Plaintiff's 
teaching certificate. It also seeks special, compensatory, and 
punitive damages. Lastly, it seeks ancillary attorneys fees 
and costs of court. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Complaint 
sets forth appropriate causes of action and the District 
Court's dismissal under Rule 12(b) was plain error. 
Point Two 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS STANDING TO SUE FOR INJUNCTIVE AND 
DECLARATORY RELIEF BECAUSE A CASE OR CONTROVERSY STILL EXISTS 
After this Court remanded the case following its decision 
in Ambus v. Utah State Board of Education, 800 P.2d 811 (1990), 
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the Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment to immediately 
restore his certificate to teach. The District Court granted 
the Plaintiff's motion. As a consequence the Plaintiff's 
certificate was restored but without any further relief. The 
Court granted the Plaintiff the right to file an amended 
complaint before determining what relief would be appropriate. 
Thereafter, the District Court dismissed the entire action 
based upon the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
On appeal the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's claims 
for injunctive relief to restore the Plaintiff's certificate 
are moot because the Defendant State Board of Education 
properly restored his certificate following the District 
Court's award of partial summary judgment. Although the 
Defendant did restore the Plaintiff's certificate, the 
Defendant did not fully comply with the District Court's Order 
and provide the Plaintiff with any proof that it complied with 
Paragraph 3 of the Order and notified every school district, in 
Utah and elsewhere, that the Plaintiff's certificate had been 
restored. The Defendant ignores this fact in its Brief to the 
Court. The fact remains that the Plaintiff has not been 
accepted for employment in the school system in Utah or 
elsewhere since his certificate was restored. The Plaintiff 
contends that the Defendants have not fully complied with the 
Court's order and, in addition, the Plaintiff claims that the 
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Defendants' dissemination of expunged information affected his 
liberty interests under Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 
572-73, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2706-07 (1972). These claims are 
ongoing in nature. Riggs v. City of Albuquerque, 916 F.2d 582, 
585-586 (10th Cir. 1990). Not only is prospective injunctive 
relief proper as to all defendants, Will, supra, but also is 
the Plaintiff's damage action as to the individual defendants, 
Hafer, supra. 
Moreover, the Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees as 
a prevailing party. Lorenc v. Call, 789 P.2d 46 (Utah App. 
1990) and Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980). The District 
Court specifically refused to address this issue despite the 
Plaintiff's argument to do so. See Plaintiff's Reply to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Point Three, p. 11. Instead, 
the District Court dismissed the Plaintiff's action with 
prejudice in its entirety. Contrary to the Defendants' 
assertion, attorney's fees is not a collateral matter which may 
be filed as an action independently of the main merits action. 
Indeed, the Defendant never made this argument to the District 
Court. The Defendant insisted that the Plaintiff's claims for 
attorney's fees be dismissed along with the Plaintiff's 
Complaint. The Plaintiff is not aware of any authority which 
suggests that a prevailing party must file a separate action 
under Section 1988 in order to recover his fees. Attorney's 
-R-
fees are, in fact, determined upon the extent a prevailing 
party is successful in his merits action. Hensly v. Eckerhart, 
461 U.S. 424 (1983). Accordingly, attorney's fees and court 
costs are core elements in civil rights actions seeking 
injunctive prospective relief. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 
(1978), reh denied, 439 U.S. 1112 (1979). In the present 
action, the District Court dismissed the Plaintiff's request 
for attorney's fees in dismissing the Plaintiff's amended 
complaint. It was plain error for the District Court to 
dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint under Rule 12(b) seeking such 
fees. 
The Defendants intimate that their actions merely violated 
the expungement code and, since they returned the certificate, 
no Section 1983 action may lie. Such is not the case. In 
Maine v. Thiboutot, supra, the Supreme Court held that this 
Court has authority to hear Section 1983 claims brought in 
state court within an administrative context where the 
administrative procedures violated federal law. The facts in 
Maine show that the Plaintiffs there sought initial judicial 
review of Maine's Human Services agency which denied them 
benefits after they prevailed. The Plaintiffs subsequently 
amended their complaint to specifically assert Section 1983 
violations to recover their attorney's fees. The Supreme Court 
upheld their award of attorney's fees. 
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Point Three 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS 
UNDER 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983 ARE BARRED BY THE UTAH 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT AND THE LAW OF THE CASE 
The Defendant specifically argued at the District Court 
level that the Plaintiff's claims were barred by the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act and the law of the case. See 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 (Record 
p. 405 and 406). The District Court dismissed the Plaintiff's 
Complaint based in part upon these specific arguments. See 
Order dated November 25, 1992, page 2. (Record, p. 490-492). 
Now, on appeal, the Defendants have retreated from these 
positions. The Defendants' Brief, page 13, states for the 
first time in this case that, "Defendants do not claim that the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act applies to the plaintiff's 
federal civil rights claims." Indeed, as Plaintiff argued 
before the District Court, Utah's Governmental Immunity Act 
cannot bar his federal civil rights claims. Martinez v. 
California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) and Felder v. Casey, 108 S.Ct. 
2303 (1988). "Accordingly, we have held that a state law that 
immunizes government conduct otherwise subject to suit under 
Section 1983 is preempted even where the federal civil rights 
litigation takes place in state court...." Id. at 2307. Also 
see Maddock v. Salt Lake City Corp., 740 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987) 
wherein this Court implicity overruled the same argument. 
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The Defendants have apparently retreated from their "law 
of the case" argument in this regard as well. The Defendants' 
Brief makes no mention of this argument at all. 
Instead, in an apparent attempt to mislead this Court, the 
Defendants assert that Utah's Governmental Immunity Act should 
apply to Plaintiff's state law claims. This argument is 
irrelevant. The Plaintiff's Complaint clearly asserts federal 
civil rights claims under Section 1983. Any confusion 
concerning this fact must be resolved against the Defendants 
under the liberal pleading rules set forth in Gomez v. Toledo 
and Morrison v. Jones, supra. If the Defendants are attempting 
to assert the statutory immunity found in the Act against the 
Plaintiff's claims founded directly under Utah's Constitution, 
the Defendants' arguments also must fail because Utah's 
Governmental Immunity Act cannot have precedence over Utah's 
Constitution. Coleman v. Utah St. Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 
631 (Utah 1990) and Corum v. University of North Carolina, 413 
S.E.2d 276 (1992). As the North Carolina Supreme Court stated 
in Corum, which is a case surprisingly similar to the instant 
one, 
"However, in determining the rights of citizens 
under the Declaration of Rights of our 
Constitution, it is the judiciary's 
responsibility to guard and protect those rights. 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot stand 
as a barrier to North Carolina's citizens who 
seek to remedy violations of their rights 
guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights. It 
would indeed be a fanciful gesture to say on the 
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one hand that citizens have constitutional 
individual civil rights that are protected from 
encroachment actions by the State, while on the 
other hand saying that individuals whose 
constitutional rights have been violated by the 
State cannot sue because of the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity." Id at 291• 
Clearly, under the Defendants1 argument the "sovereign immunity 
tail" would be wagging the "constitutional dog." 
Point Four 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE ON THE PLAINTIFF'S 
CAUSES OF ACTION ARISING DIRECTLY UNDER THE FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
In Point IV of the Defendants' Brief, the Defendants 
challenge whether the Plaintiff may allege a direct violation 
of the Federal Constitution because the named individual 
Defendants are state officials and not federal officials. The 
Plaintiff submits the Defendants are incorrect in their 
position. Since Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), Courts 
have permitted suits against state officials for direct 
violations of the Federal Constitution. This includes damage 
actions against the officials when sued in an individual 
capacity. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, & 
Prescott, 112 S.Ct. 1028 (1992), Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 
232, 237-238 (1974). Also see Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 
cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 2562 (1990) (11th Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 110 S.Ct. 2562, 109 L.Ed.2d 744 (1990) and other cases 
cited in Plaintiff's Appellant Brief, p. 47-49. 
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Noteably, the Defendants do not contest on appeal the 
Plaintiff's right to sue directly under Utah's Constitution. 
Paragraphs 19, 37, 44, and 48 of the Plaintiff's complaint 
allege direct violations of Utah's Constitution. For example, 
Article I, Section 7 provides, "No person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty or property, without due process of law." This 
court has held that decisions relating to the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution are "highly 
persuasive" when interpreting the due process clause of the 
Utah Constitution. Vali Convalescent & Care Inst, v. Ind. 
Com'n., 649 P.2d 33, 35-36 (Utah 1982). In Davis v. Passman, 
422 U.S. 228 (1979), the Supreme Court held that a cause of 
action and damage remedy may be implied directly under the Due 
Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. If Davis is highly 
persuasive, this court should also imply a direct cause of 
action under Article I, Section 7, of Utah's Constitution. 
Despite either the Defendants' ignorance or cavalier 
attitude on this point, state appellate courts vigorously 
defend its citizens from unwarranted governmental abridgement 
of rights guaranteed by their own constitutions. Again, a most 
instructive case is Corum v. University of North Carolina, 
supra, where the Carolina Supreme Court specifically and 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFfS CLAIMS 
ARE BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
i. 
Applicable Statute of Limitations 
The Defendant ignores the decision of Wilson v. Garcia, 
471 U.S. 261 (1985). This seminole decision held that states 
must apply the limitations period which are applicable to 
personal injury cases. The rationale was due to the federal 
interests in "uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of 
unnecessary litigation". Id. at 275. The court held that 
these federal interests could best be achieved by 
"characterizing" Section 1983 claims as personal injury claims. 
"The characterization of all Section 1983 actions as involving 
claims for personal injuries minimizes the risk that the choice 
of a state statute of limitations would not fairly serve the 
federal interests vindicated by Section 1983". Id. at 279. 
This characterization prevents state laws from 
"discriminat[ing] against federal claims, or be inconsistent 
with federal law in any respect." 
Utah's legislature, in attempting to truncate federal 
interests, enacted Section 78-12-28(3) U.C.A. (1953) to provide 
a two year statute of limitation, and was in direct response to 
the Tenth Circuit's decision of Mismash v. Murray City, 730 
F.2d 1366 (10th Cir. 1984). Clearly this is an abuse of 
-li-
legislative function. This legislative action is squarely 
contemptuous of Wilson and cannot be condoned. As stated in 
Federal v. Casey, supra, at 2306, which struck down Wisconsin's 
notice-of-claim statute, a "federal right cannot be defeated by 
the forms of local practice." 
In Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corp., supra, at 1339, 
footnote 1, this Court recognized the conflict between Wilson 
and Section 78-12-28(3). However, it left the validity of the 
statute for another day. The Plaintiff respectfully submits 
that the day has come to strike down the statute as unduly 
restrictive of federal civil rights. 
ii. 
Relation Back 
The Defendants dispute that the concept of relation back 
is applicable in this case. In response, the Plaintiff submits 
that he did make a timely request to amend his complaint which 
was denied by the trial court. Further, assuming that Utah's 
two year statute is applicable from the Plaintiff's second 
request to amend his complaint, the Plaintiff claims that the 
principle of relation back is indeed applicable to the facts of 
this case. 
This is contrary to the Defendant's assertion that the 
Plaintiff did not attempt to characterize his action as a 
Section 1983 action until after the remand in Ambus v. state 
Board of Education, supra. 
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The Plaintiff filed his original complaint and request for 
a preliminary injunction in a hurried fashion due to the fact 
the Defendants1 actions removed the Plaintiff from his job and 
classroom. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the 
Plaintiff's original complaint based on Utah's Governmental 
Immunity Act. (Record 148-149). In response, the Plaintiff 
pointed out Felder v. Casey, supra, which rebutted the 
Defendant's motion in its entirety. In the Plaintiff's 
response, the Plaintiff specifically requested the right to 
amend to be more specific with his Section 1983 allegations. 
(Record 162-164). This request to amend was clearly within the 
limitations period. The District Court thereafter refused to 
permit an amendment to assert Section 1983 damages due to the 
belief that Felder v. Casey was not applicable but permitted an 
amendment only for purposes of claims involving judicial 
review. (See Exhibit A, at Record p. 178). Subsequently, 
following this Court's remand following the interlocutory 
appeal, the Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint 
insisting on the Section 1983 damages which resulted in the 
dismissal which is before this Court. Based upon these facts, 
the Plaintiff did in fact make a timely application to amend 
his complaint which was erroneously denied by the trial court. 
Additionally, even if this Court disregards the 
Plaintiff's initial request to amend, the Plaintiff's Second 
Amended Complaint should be viewed under the relation back 
-13-
principle as set forth in Plaintiff's Appellant Brief. The 
Defendants were well aware that a civil rights action was 
pending due to their own motions to dismiss. Due to the trial 
court's intransigence the Plaintiff was not permitted to 
specifically name each of the additional parties. Changing the 
capacity in which the Defendants are sued did not change any of 
the material allegations of the complaint or add new causes of 
action. As stated in Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York,, 
761 P. 2d 581, 586 (Utah App. 1988) and Doxy-Lay ton Co. v. 
Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976), an exception exists to 
the rule against adding new parties where the new and old 
parties have an identity of interest. The State Board of 
Education and the named individuals clearly have such identity 
of interest. The Attorney General has represented all 
Defendants in this action from the initial hearings in this 
case before the Defendant Board to the present time. The 
Defendant Utah State Board of Education and all other 
Defendants were clearly put on notice of these claims as argued 
in Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief, at p. 20-27. 
Point Six 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS ARE 
ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
The Defendants do not make any serious attempt to justify 
their actions under the ministerial distinction to the 
qualified immunity defense as argued in Appellant's Brief, p. 
-14-
35-41 • Ignoring this distinction, the Defendants primarily 
argue that they are entitled to the defense of qualified 
immunity under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
The ministerial distinction, however, is critical to an 
examination of the Plaintiff's claims. Only if the ministerial 
distinction fails must the court examine the test in Harlow. 
The ministerial distinction is based upon the difference 
between discretionary acts, such as the decision to bring 
charges to suspend or revoke the Plaintiff's certificate, and 
the ministerial acts which implement such discretionary 
decision. Ministerial acts are not clothed with qualified 
immunity if such acts violates the Plaintiff's civil or 
constitutional rights. See Appellant's Brief, p. 40-41. Also 
see Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 196 n. 14 (1984) where the 
Supreme Court emphasized this distinction and Breault v. 
Chairman of Bd. of Fire Com'rs, 513 N.E.2d 1277 (Mass. 1987), 
cert, denied subnom. Forastiere v. Breault, 108 S.Ct. 1078 
(1988). Also cf. Utah State Univ., Etc. v. Stro & Co., 646 
P.2d 715, 712 (Utah 1982) where this court recognized the 
distinction of discretionary-ministerial duties involving the 
qualified immunity defense in an action to recover investments 
improperly placed. In this case, the Plaintiff does not 
challenge the Defendant's decision to bring charges to suspend 
or revoke his certificate. Rather he challenges the method and 
manner of implementing such decision. He challenges whether 
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the Defendants can take his certificate, resulting in loss of 
employment and reputation, by taking his certificate without 
any pretermination hearing, by conducting hearings without 
compliance with the appropriate statutory notice, by taking his 
certificate without any findings of fact, by using evidence at 
the hearings which violated Utah's expungement code, and 
ultimately by relying upon a newspaper article in justifying 
its conduct. These are all well pleaded allegations contained 
in the Plaintiff's Complaint which should survive a motion to 
dismiss. 
With respect to the Defendant's direct claim of qualified 
immunity, the Plaintiff points out that even acts deemed 
discretionary in character are not entitled to qualified 
immunity if such acts violate "clearly established" rights, 
Harlow, supra. The quarrel seems to lie in what the 
Plaintiff's clearly established rights were at the time they 
were violated. The Defendants contest only two items in their 
brief. First, they assert the notice provisions of Section 
2 
53A-7-111 U.C.A. (1953), as amended, were satisfied by merely 
Section 53A-7-lll(l) provides that the Educational 
Professional Practices Commission, an arm of the Defendant 
Board, may not adversely affect a person's certificate "without 
giving the individual an opportunity for a fair hearing." 
Subsection (2) provides, "If an individual fails to request a 
hearing within 30 days after written notice is sent to the last 
known address and to the address shown on the records of the 
commission, the commission may take action against the 
certificate holder under this section." (Emphasis added). 
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sending notice to the Plaintifffs last known address. The 
Defendants claim that a notice was mailed certified but 
returned. However, the Defendants do not discuss Plaintiff's 
contentions that the face of the documents do not show any 
official postmark, postage, certified fee, or date stamp. See 
Appellant's Brief, p. 7. Moreover, even assuming the notice 
was merely mailed to the Plaintiff's last known address, such 
act violates Section 53A-7-111 which also requires mailing to 
the Plaintiff's permanent mailing address which was not done in 
this case. Notwithstanding the fact that the alleged mailing 
was returned, no other action was taken to provide actual 
notice to the Plaintiff despite the fact the Defendants knew 
the Plaintiff had filed suit in federal court, was represented 
by specific counsel, and was teaching in the Salt Lake School 
District which is generally supervised and controlled by the 
Defendant Board. Section 53A-7-111 is a mandatory act where no 
discretion is permitted. Moreover, it was clearly established 
that notice, in order to comport with due. process, be 
Contrary to the Defendants' contentions, the records show 
the Plaintiff's permanent address as different from the address 
to where the notice was allegedly mailed. It is significant to 
note that someone other than the Plaintiff, and presumably a 
Defendant, crossed off the Plaintiff's permanent address in 
these records in an apparent attempt to show that the two 
addresses were the same. See Exhibit B attached. The 
Plaintiff's permanent address has never changed and remains the 
El Serrito address to this date. 
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"reasonably calculated under all the circumstances" to give 
interested parties an opportunity to protect their interests. 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 
313-314 (1950). Ignoring a party's actual permanent address 
contained in their own records, ignoring a party's counsel, and 
ignoring the Plaintiff's actual place of work which was under 
the Defendants' control, and blindly relying upon mailing to a 
questionable last known address, violated the Mullane standard. 
With respect to the expungement matter, contrary to 
Defendants' desires, Utah's Expungement Act has been around for 
a long time. The Defendants cannot deny that Utah's 
Expungement Act, Section 77-18-2(5)(a) U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended, was clearly established. Within the context of the 
specific facts of this case, the Tenth Circuit recently ruled 
that Granite Board of Education's violation of Utah's 
Expungement Act violated Plaintiff's Section 1983 rights to due 
process of law. Ambus v. Granite Board of Education, Appellate 
No. 91-4015, issued 9/24/92, rehearing granted 11/12/92 on 
Eleventh Amendment Immunity issue only. In advance of the 
hearing in this case before the Defendant Board, and at the 
In advance of the "reconsideration hearings" Plaintiff's 
counsel made the Defendants aware of their constitutional 
violations surrounding their actions, Defendants refused to 
return the Plaintiff's certificate, and instead sent notice to 
all fifty states and Utah School Districts of the revocation. 
(Plaintiff's Initial Brief, Exhibit G). 
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time of the hearing, the Plaintiff specifically informed the 
Board of the expungement law and the fact the plain language of 
the act prohibited what they intended to do and ultimately did. 
Instead, the Defendants attempted to carve out an "exception" 
to this plain language and failed. This Court in Ambus v. 
State Board of Education, 800 P.2d 811 (1990) did not invent 
any protection for the Plaintiff but instead merely enforced 
the plain language of the expungement statute. In addition, 
this court had already held against the position advanced by 
the Defendants as early as 1980 in Matter of Noren, 621 P.2d 
1247 (1980). Doe v. Utah Department of Public Safety, 782 P.2d 
489 (1989) had also been decided adversely to the Defendants1 
position by the district court and the Attorney General was 
involved in that case as well. Lastly, it was clearly 
established under Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 
433 U.S. 425 (1977) that one element of privacy, protected by 
the constitution, is the unwelcomed disclosure of personal 
matters protected by statute. As stated in Mangels v. Pena, 
789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986), citing Nixon, "Information 
is constitutionally protected when a legitimate expectation 
exists that it will remain confidential while in the state's 
possession." 
The Defendants1 lame excuse that it didn't know the law is 
unacceptable. The rights which were violated were clearly 
-1 Q-
established and were rights which a reasonable person should 
have known• The trial court's finding of qualified immunity 
was in error and should be reversed by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff's certificate to teach was revoked by the 
Defendants based upon a newspaper account without any notice to 
the Plaintiff, without any pretermination hearing, and with 
sealed and expunged records during a "reconsideration" 
post-termination hearing, without first restoring the 
Plaintiff's certificate, and with no findings of fact or 
conclusions of law. Such action resulted in his dismissal as a 
teacher from the Salt Lake School District. Ultimately the 
District Court ordered the return of his certificate. However, 
the Plaintiff suffered real and substantial damages in the form 
of attorney's fees and loss of income. The core inquiry is 
whether the state Board and its officials may be shielded from 
any responsibility for their unconstitutional conduct. The 
critical question is whether the Defendants are protected from 
federal Section 1983 liability in some fashion under state law. 
The Plaintiff suggests not. The Plaintiff in this case spent 
six years achieving a college education and a certificate to 
practice what our society deems a professional calling. Not 
only was this abruptly taken from the Plaintiff in violation of 
the law, it resulted in the loss of significant employment 
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income, future pay, and substantial attorney's fees. Not only 
was the Plaintiff banned from teaching in Utah schools but, 
through the Defendants notification procedures to other states, 
he was banned from seeking employment anywhere in the United 
States. Even though his certificate was returned, no school 
district in Utah has since hired the Plaintiff due to the 
widespread dissemination of the events which were supposed to 
be sealed and expunged. Accordingly the Plaintiff's liberty 
interests, or his name and reputation, has been adversely 
affected. 
The founders of our State and Federal Constitutions 
envisioned a system of government that would be accountable for 
its irresponsible actions. The Defendants are required by law, 
Section 53A-13-101(4) U.C.A. (1988), to establish statewide 
curriculum requirements which teach "obedience to law, respect 
for and the understanding of the Constitutions of the United 
States and for the State of Utah." The Plaintiff respectfully 
submits that the District Court erred in dismissing his 
complaint for damages and attorney's fees. The Defendants' 
actions in this case were clearly unlawful. The Plaintiff 
respectfully requests that this Court reinstate the Plaintiff's 
case, hold that the Plaintiff has stated proper claims, and 
remand with instructions to proceed with the evidence. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court 
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reverse the District Court and reinstate the Plaintiff's 
Complaint in full. The Plaintiff respectfully requests that 
this Court remand with instructions to the District Court to: 
1. Determine whether the Defendant Utah State Board of 
Education complied with the Order of the District Court to 
notify all jurisdictions of the reinstatement of Plaintiff's 
certificate. 
2. Award attorney's fees against the Defendant Utah 
State Board of Education and its officials in their official 
capacities as ancillary to the equitable relief already granted 
in restoring the Plaintiff's certificate and ancillary to the 
proof of compliance with the District Court's Order. 
3. Consider the Plaintiff's claims for damages due to 
his employment, and special, general and punitive damages 
against the individual defendants in their individual 
capacities. 
4. Consider what additional attorney's fees may be due 
should the Plaintiff prevail on his theories of damages against 
the individual defendants in their individual capacities. 
DATED this / °f day of November, 1992. 
STEPHEN W. COOK 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
-22-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
STEPHEN W. COOK, being duly sworn, says: 
Stephen W. Cook, of the law firm COOK & DAVIS, attorney 
for Plaintiff/Appellant herein; served the attached 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF upon: 
Brent A. Burnett 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and 
depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
the /fl5Uctay of November, 1992. 
STEPHEN W. COOK 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
November, 1992. 
»$£?E,£iL'KWTSC.\ 
^ 4*^ Sta*~ ---•* *ww'-
* TTommishsi©] My" roTrmftShsioH-Sxpires: Residing a t Sal t Lake County 
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EXHIBIT A 
PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES BARRED 
BY UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
v* w us i \ z i n i - . U i v ? | 2 11W I 
County of Sait Lake - State of Utan 
FILE NO. 890901757 AA 
TITLE: [' PARTIES PRESENT) COUNSEL: (• COUNSEL PRESENT) 
GREGORY AMBUS 
• v s -
UTAH STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION 
Stephen W. Cook 
John S. McAllister 
CLERK HON. James s , Sawaya 
JUDGE 
REPORTER 
D A T E : May 1 6 , 1989 
Thp. mat.t.p.r of defendant's Motion to Dismiss came on regularly for 
hiring on fhp 1 5f-h day of May, 1989 with appearances as above stated. 
Thft n? ^ tPr was f^lly presented, arquea and submitted, and decision oj_ 
thp rnnrf- f-^ kpn n^Q.r advisement. The Court having reviewed the pleadings 
^nd t-hp Rnhmi ssions of the parties and having considered the arguement of 
-rnnngpl
 r now makftg jf-.g ruling a:; follows: 
_ Plaintiff's claim for damages is barred by the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act as applied to the uncontroverted facts of this case and the 
claim of the Plaintiff for damages. See Utah Code Annotated, Sec, 63-30-1 
et« sea. The Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claim for damages is granted. 
Plaintiff's Petition for judicial review of the order of the administrative 
board is not dismissed, however that claim is vague, and Plaintiff is 
..granted t-P.n days from date of this Minute Entry r.uleing to file an# 
.amended Petition setting forthg# his saii claim and the relief sought. 
lis 
C o o i e s t o c o u n s e l /WN * . C r> J v /vY\ n ,. \r i(\0*0 -
EXHIBIT B 
PERMANENT ADDRESS OF PLAINTIFF 
SB 0340 
Rec. by Westminster 8-13-81 
Record of Teaching Experience 
Applicant May Write in This Space 
(List Chronologically—Do Not Include Substitute or Student Teaching) 
School 






Major Assignment 1 




(Grade or Subject) 1 
2ojjrjr/>A 
Years 
19 to 19 
ML 5335**/ 
$3 rirU 
ATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Division" o f Staff D 
Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
UTAH ST
250 East 
Gregory Thomas Ambus 
* on 
3fc t- m< <s» JL+ ,C_ SO L f'j mm0f f y ' u* 
Full Nome 0>t€.ctru I 
Mailing address -S&ji^L 
Xi etna* A&J. 
\J •*/ r- • -
Development ^)££ & f A /1 
DoteOtcl<| -SO, I9SI 
hJL 
Sex IA MoritalStatus SSnt/*. C i t i z e n s h i p / A S 
Soc. Sec. Wo.SM-W-Cftfi 
Date of Birth /p - 2 - ST 
Place of Birth Qdo*„ CM, A 
i£VJ4£-
Tchg. Minor lr&c*.fe T c h g . M o j o r o / ^ / o ^ y l
~-— Year granted 
Have you ever had a certificate revoked or suspended ? A/d Where ? Have you ever been 
convicted of violating any law (except traffic violations)? fijO If yesy explain on separate sheet. 
Applicant Should Not Write in This Space 
Type# of 

















COOK AND WILDE 
S 1EP1 f EN W COOK A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION 
ROBERT H WILDE 
.ONAL1) E KUNZ 6925 UNION PARK CENTER, SUITE 490 
JOHN K RICE MIDVALE, UTAH 84047 TELEPHONE 801-255-6000 
_ FAX 801-561-3829 
REIDC DAVIS 
KELLY DE HILL 
April 3, 1989 
HAND DELIVERED 
Honorable James S. Sawaya 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Gregory Ambus v. Granite Board of Education 
Civil No* 890901757AA 
Dear Judge Sawaya: 
Following the hearing on Wednesday, March 29f 1989, Mr. 
Ambus obtained the enclosed record of address from Granite 
School District* He obtained this document from Mary Lou 
Stark, director of secondary personnel. Please note that Mr. 
Ambus1 permanent and present address is listed as 3316 El. 
Serrito Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. I am also informed Mary 
Lou Stark would testify that she was not contacted by Roger 
Mauritzen or his office concerning Mr. Ambus1 address. 
If at all possible, I would like this added to the 
record. If you would like the information in the form of an 
Affidavit or other testimony, please do not hesitate to 





cc: John McAllister (hand delivered) 
sttfflSftto- : 3 * 0 § AST 3 § 4 | S O U T H * SALT L A K E X 1 T V . UTAH S4f15 
AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER 
*Jame Jlrabus- -Gregory Thomas ( 
Date o f A p p l i c a t i o n 
? Da te of B i r t h 
+-o*.? 
.esent A w ^ . 3316 E l . Serr i to dr. Tel 4&b^£53> 
Salt Lake Ci ty , Utah 
C i t y & S u i t e 
Sex M a r i t a l S ta tus D 1 V O r C C Q
 A g e o f C h , | d r e n 
Mor F 
Name o f S p o u s e . 
P e r m a n e n t Add ress 
MAIUfcN 
3316 E l . Serr i to Dr. 
C i t y & S ta te 
Sal t Lake C i t y , Utah 
-Tel 487485: 
2 year o ld daughter He igh t . Weight . 
INSTITUTION 
COLLEGES & UNIVERSITIES YOU HAVE ATTENDED 
OATESOf ATTENOANCE FROM TO 
Social Security No 5 2 9 - 9 4 - 5 9 4 6 
HOUHSOI - CRLDI 
DEGRfcE 8. DATE R E C E I V E D O u A R I t R SEMfcST 
Westminster Cdllege Salt Lake City 1973 1979 B.S. Biology May 1980 
I ype 
E l e m e n t a l y 
Secondar y • • • 
( o the r ) 
-UTAH CEMTtP tCATIOM 
E x p n a t i o n Date 
t+j+totDMtrtBM***^ 
Out. i o lie A p p l i e d For 
"May 8, ia«l 
G r a n i t e Schoo l D i s t r i c t o f f e r s a self i nsu red hea l th a n d m e d i c a l insurance coverage \C 
i ts e m p l o y e e s a n d the i r spouses a n d dependen t c h i l d r e n A f t e r e m p l o y m e n t a n o 
e m p l o y e e w i l l bt asked t o f i l l o u t a d e t a i l e d hea l t h h i s t o r y r e p o r t on h i rnsel f /hersel 
a n d h is /her f a m i l y w h i c h may resul t in an insurance wa ive t ( s ) tor a p re -ex i s tm 
c o n d i n o n ( s ) F u r t h e r each n e w e m p l o y e e w i l l be asked t o f u r n i s h the D i s t u c t w i t 
a persona l h e a l t h e x j m m a t i o n r e p o r t by a med ica l d o c t o r 
rftri'Tj" H'I» ,7Vn 
—rrrrrrw-v^
 r -nrr^^rw^^ j 
K I N D . 
t S T _ 
2 N D _ 
3 R D _ 
4 T H _ 
* T H _ 
H _ 
Counse l i ng 
Fo re ign Language . 
(Spec i f y ) 
Lang A r t s 
M a t h 
Med ia 
T e a m T e a c h i n g . 
( o t he r ) 
Mus ic (Voca l ) 
Mus i c ( I n s t r u m e n t ) . 
P i a n o 
Phys E d 
R e a d i n g 
Science 
Soc Stud ies . 
Spec E d (Spec i fy ) 
( o t h e r ) . 
M a j o r ( i ) 
B i a i a g y i i i i i i i N ' " • • l [ 
M i n o r ( s ) . 
Physical Science 
C o u l d T e a c h 7-1? Science in Jr . High up to advanr 
.Biology in High School Biology-Tennis Coach 
Sub jec t P»r t i n n e t - ^ _ -
* • • • * • 
Prefer J u n i o r H igh 
Spec ia l I n t w r e s t w i n 
Senior H igh 
Tenn'rf'tb^^-'Te'ffftTS'^fh^Ta'Pgh f j5utt&Sffirfti •fte'r 
Currently ranged 5th in btate MeTf-s-ft-smgit 
HUM WHICH PLACEMENT BUREAU MAY WE OBTAIN YOUR CREDENTIALS OR CONF IDENTIAL F ILE 
Westminster Colleqe Placement •->• 













Street Address City State 
rROFEWIONAL £K»ER»ENCE 
DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE 
j School 
j Jordan Ii 
Address 
itermediate llthW 4thS 
| Fast. High School 13E 8thS 
1 Indian H 
1 r 
1 ' -






Years Grade or Subjects Taught Principal 
Sept 7p Dec 7|8 h^l t -year 8tn bciance Mr. A11 en— 
Septl9B0 Dec [ Feb 19B1 May 
/v 
198(0 hal t-year Adv. \V lacementt 1U-1Z. 
ids: 
1 




t any school district or organization to which you are now under cont rac t . 
ve you ever been discharged f rom employment? (explain) 
ve you ever been convicted of a crime other than traff ic violations? (explain) HO 
t you a relative of any administrator of Granite School District? Yes * * No 
ereby cert i fy that my statements on this application are true and correct. 
mature . 
Date iJ 
. If yes, Name , R i l l PhristnmilniK -
U. S. Citizenship _ _ l £ S K3.0U&UJ. 
Yes or No 
ipioyment approved by 
ary: / ' " ~~" 
C_'S~&;0 *^Srfcnnl A__ r 
. Grade/Sub|. 
. Replaces. 
' / % 
